

AWS re:Invent

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NET314

Building DDoS-resilient applications using AWS Shield

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AWS

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Security Manager, AWS Shield
AWS



Agenda

1. Protecting the availability of the AWS network

- Web traffic
- DNS
- Traffic from impacted AWS customers

2. How we stop DDoS before the first attack packet


- Threat intelligence
- Monitoring botnets

3. Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience


Protecting the availability of the AWS network




AWS shared responsibility model




Network layer attacks



Network layer attacks



Application layer attacks



Challenges of scale

- Many possible points of ingress for internet traffic
- Monitoring on a very large network
- Destination endpoint capacity varies (a lot)
- Distinguishing legitimate traffic from the malicious
- Picking the best mitigation strategy

How big is big?

- ~1 million DDoS attacks per year
- Exabytes of data analyzed every minute
- 1,000s of DDoS attacks mitigated every day
- 100+ billion AMR requests processed per day
- 300 GB of flow logs ingested every second


Traffic routes (utopia)



Points of internet traffic ingress



Points of internet traffic ingress



Points of internet traffic ingress



Types of traffic and services



1

Web traffic to a CDN



Types of traffic and services



2

DNS
traffic

1

Web
traffic to
a CDN



Types of traffic and services



2

DNS traffic

1

Web traffic to a CDN

3

Any traffic to an AWS-managed endpoint



Types of traffic and services



Possible traffic routes (more like the reality)



Every route into AWS is a potential DDoS entry point



Types of traffic and services



1

Web traffic to a CDN




DDoS protection: Web traffic to CloudFront

Expected traffic well defined
(TCP/HTTP/QUIC/:80/:443)




Amazon CloudFront

Request flood →




The request flood attack




The request flood attack

Traffic diversion with
DNS and Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP)




The request flood attack




L7 auto mitigation with AWS Shield Advanced




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
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
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
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

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Amazon CloudFront


SYN flood



Connecting to Amazon CloudFront




SYN




Time




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
Connecting to Amazon CloudFront



Connecting to Amazon CloudFront



SYN proxy mitigation: During the event





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


Amazon CloudFront


UDP amplification




The amplification attack



The amplification attack



The amplification attack



Protocols and bandwidth amplification factor

Protocol	Bandwidth amplification factor
DNS	28 to 54
NTP	556.9
SSDP	30.8
CharGEN	358.8
RIPv1	131.24
CLDAP	56 to 70
Memcached	10,000 to 51,000

Source: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A>

Types of traffic and services



2

DNS traffic

1

Web traffic to a CDN



DDoS protection: DNS traffic to Route 53




Amazon Route 53




AWS Shield

DDoS protection: DNS traffic to Route 53




DNS known good resolvers (DKGR) mitigation




Traffic shaping mitigation

 = Packet  = Rate limit



Traffic shaping: Below rate limit

 = Packet  = Rate limit




Traffic shaping: Above rate limit


 = Packet  = Rate limit



Attackers work around DKGR mitigation



Mitigating cache-busting attacks



Types of traffic and services



DDoS protection: Any traffic to any endpoint

Any Protocol
Port



Web applications
VoIP
Non-HTTP apps
Content streaming
DNS
IoT
...

DDoS protection: Any traffic to any endpoint

“Just monitor endpoint capacity”



Mac instance



M1 Mac instance



T4g instance



T3 instance



T3a instance



T2 instance



M6g instance



M6gd instance



M6i instance



M6a instance



M5 instance



M5a instance



M5d instance



M5n instance



M5dn instance



M5zn instance



M4 instance



A1 instance



C7g instance



C6g instance



C6gd instance



C6gn instance



C6i instance



C6a instance



Hpc6a instance



C5 instance



C5d instance



C5a instance



C5ad instance



C5n instance




C4 instance

DDoS protection: Any traffic to any endpoint


Challenges

1. Legitimate layer 7 traffic is determined by your application
2. Understanding NetFlow traffic at scale: 50 TB collected per day
3. Delays in detection and mitigation latency

DDoS protection: NACL



Promote to
the border



DDoS protection: Byte match

```
0000 5d a2 c8 22 02 00 00 00 ad d3 00 00 23 56 73 25  ]..".....#Vs%
0010 fa 61 32 4c 00 00 00 00 f0 d9 49 4e 00 00 00 00  .a2L.....IN....
0020 79 61 25 0b 03 00 00 00 7b 61 25 0b 9e 27 00 00  ya%.....{a%..'..
0030 a6 02 00 00 fe ff ff ff 6d 6e 00 00 03 00 70 02  .....mn....p.
0040 a5 02 2f 00 ff ff f9 ff ff c1 3f                ../.....?
```




AWS Shield


DDoS protection: Health-based detection



DDoS protection: When AWS is the source



DDoS protection: When AWS is the source



Stopping DDoS before the first attack packet


We have a time machine



Intel collected, now protect our customers

1. A suspicious source IP address sending us the exploit attempt
2. The signature of their exploit attempt
3. A suspicious endpoint IP address hosting malware
4. The malware binary itself
5. A treasure map to the command and control (C2) server

Update managed
firewall rules



AWS
Network
Firewall



AWS
WAF

Update malware
detection signatures



Amazon
GuardDuty

Cut out the “brain”



Takedown time



C2 attack commands



C2 endpoint



Vector	Target IP and port	Attack parameters
! STOMP	54.38.125.000 30120	100 32 ALL 10 1024
! UDP	70.70.70.000 80 40000	32 0 10
! TCP	45.142.122.000 80	60 32 ACK 0 10
! STD	45.142.122.000 80	60
! HTTP	178.237.56.000 80	10

Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience




DDoS
resilience
ring

Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience




Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience

Architect for resilience



Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience




Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience

Distributed network capacity

Use edge services



Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience



Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience


Actively monitor



Business Summary Dashboard



Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience



Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience


Scalable applications




Elastic Load
Balancing (ELB)



Amazon EC2
Auto Scaling




Amazon
DynamoDB



Scale the whole stack

Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience



Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience

Define your security model



Amazon VPC



Network access
control list



AWS WAF



Rule



Managed
rule



Filtering
rule



Labels



Bot
control



Bot



Bad bot



AWS Network
Firewall




Endpoints



AWS Firewall
Manager

Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience



Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience

Collaborate with AWS on security



AWS Shield



Health-based detections




Proactive response



Advanced mitigations

Framework for thinking about DDoS resilience



Thank you!

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bodmerpb@amazon.com



Please complete the session
survey in the **mobile app**

