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Container security and avoiding the 2 a.m. call

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Agenda

- The dreaded call
- What container threats have you seen?
- Container security model
- Key questions
- Takeaways

The dreaded call

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By the numbers

- 60% of organizations have experienced container security incidents last year
- 47% deployed containers are known to have vulnerabilities
- Top concerns \bullet
 - 54% <u>Inadequate</u> container security <u>knowledge</u> among the teams •
 - 52% Limited visibility into security of containers/images •
 - 43% Inability to <u>assess risk</u> in container images prior to deployment •
- Average cost of a **data breach** is **\$3.92 million** \bullet
- Approximately 60% of the small businesses that experience a data \bullet breach are out of business within six months

Source: https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/devops/organizations-container-security-incident/ https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach

The context of an attack

- You lose control of your infrastructure Someone else (possibly multiple people) are in control of your resources You are paying to allow someone else to use your resources
- Your business function may no longer execute The actor does not share your goal of maintaining your business They may shut down your business functions to do what they intend
- Your resources may be used for nefarious purposes More than likely your resources will be repurposed That purpose could be illegal and expose you
- The frequency of these events has increased for our customers •



What container threats have you seen?

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Container-specific threats (we have seen)

Container image corruption

Someone adds something to your image

Example: Public images with embedded cryptocurrency-mining malware June 2018: Docker Hub – Used to mine cryptocurrency

Vulnerabilities in your platform


Use of dependencies can be exploited



Example: Unsecured Kubernetes dashboard with cloud account credentials Feb. 2018: Tesla – Exploited to mine cryptocurrency June 2018: Weight Watchers – Not exploited

Containers are not hardened in the same way as your other servers

Tools and processes that work for server instances are not leveraged with your containers



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


Container security model

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Container security model – Defense in depth





Sensitive config (passwords, Gotchas: Commits to source, non-separated access (dev has cleartext password)

What are the key questions?

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How do you secure the container lifecycle?



How do you secure the container lifecycle?

Registries

- Create private registries
- Keep images close to runtime (cache image copies in your registry)
- Use curated registry (official images on Docker Hub)

Images

- Scan images and perform static analysis
- Sign images and verify signature

Build and automate container image continuousdelivery pipeline






Image registry



Container runtime

Clair



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


How do you manage secrets?

How do you manage secrets?

- Do not store secrets in the Dockerfile
- Leverage AWS Secrets Manager or SSM Parameter Store to store secrets

	SSM Parameter Store	AWS Secrets Manager	
Encryption	AWS KMS	AWS KMS	
Authentication/ authorization	AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM)	IAM	
Secret rotation	Static	Dynamic	



aws secretsmanager create-secret --name <SECRETNAME> --description "rds/secret" -secret-string [{"testkey1":"testvalue1"}] --region <REGION>

/prod/rds/secret-username /prod/rds/secret-password

value: "https://secretsmanager.us-west-2.amazonaws.com"



AWS KMS

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How do you secure a container host?

How do you secure a container host?

Hardening

- SE Linux
- Bastille Linux
- App Armor

Protection

- AWS Systems Manager (Patch Manager, State Manager)
- AWS WAF
- Detection
- Amazon Inspector
- Amazon GuardDuty







Amazon GuardDuty

Amazon Inspector

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How do you gain visibility into a container-based workload?

Container logging and monitoring

Logging

- Amazon CloudWatch Logs/awslogs
- Log routing (Fluentd, Fluent Bit, Logstash, FireLens)

Monitoring

- Amazon CloudWatch Events
- Container insights
- Third party Twistlock, Aqua, NeuVector, etc.

Forensics

- Evolving space
- Docker ecosystem tools and AWS IR
- Third party/open-source GRR, Sysdig, ThreatResponse





fluentd

fluentbit

monitor your EKS and Kubernetes clusters. Please	provide feedback through this I	ink. You can also send email directly to containerin	sightsfeedback@amazon.com.
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How do you securely network your container-based application?

How do you securely network your container-based application?

Least privilege

• IAM roles at container or task level

Network isolation

- Task networking
- VPC CNI plugin for Kubernetes
- Private subnets for your worker nodes

Service mesh

 Monitor and control microservice communications with AWS App Mesh













Third-party solutions

- Sysdig \bullet
- Qualys ightarrow
- Tigera \bullet
- NeuVector

Typical features include:

- Configuration/asset management \bullet
- **Reporting and dashboard** \bullet
- Running container analysis \bullet
- Vulnerability assessment \bullet
- Network analysis and compliance \bullet









Takeaways

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Takeaways

- Experiencing security exposure can be fatal to an organization \bullet
- AWS container services have more AWS responsibility than other \bullet services
- There is a structured approach to developing a secure container application

Related sessions

CON334-R1 – Running high-security workloads on Amazon EKS Friday, Dec. 6, 9:15 a.m.–10:15 a.m., Venetian, Level 3, Lido 3005 CON315-R1 – Deep dive: Observability of Kubernetes applications Friday, Dec. 6, 10:45 a.m.–11:45 a.m., Mirage, St. Thomas B CON317-R2 – Securing your Amazon EKS cluster Thursday, Dec. 5, 2:30 p.m.–3:30 p.m., Mirage, Events Center C1, Table 1 CON414-R3 – Security best practices for AWS Fargate Friday, Dec. 6, 10 a.m.–11 a.m., Mirage, Grand Ballroom B, Table 8 CON317-R3 – Securing your Amazon EKS cluster Friday, Dec. 6, 10 a.m.–11 a.m., Mirage, Events Center C1, Table 9

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