# AWS Invent

NET311-R2

# Network architectures for ingress traffic inspection

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### **Design considerations**

INBOUND INSPECTION CHECKLIST









Application type

HTTP(S)

Non-HTTP(S)

Control plane & data plane

Centralized

Distributed

Inspection depth

TCP/IP filtering

Application-aware


Scale

One VPC

Many VPCs



### Sample workload








**Amazon GuardDuty** 



Flow logs




Traffic mirroring







### Sample workload










Flow logs




Traffic mirroring







### Why go beyond SG & NACLs for ingress?





## Centralized versus distributed – Data plane models

#### **Centralized**

Internet access to multiple VPCs via a single VPC

Higher data processing costs, lower per-hour costs

#### **Distributed**

Each VPC has its own internet access

Lower data processing costs, higher per-hour costs

\* Management / control plane can be centralized in both scenarios



### Distributed VPC security integrations

**AWS WAF** 

**ELB** sandwich

Supported app:

HTTP(S) only

TLS decryption:

True

Inspection depth:


Application layer


Data plane:

Distributed

Management:

Centralized via FMS





Supported app:

Any

TLS decryption:

True

Inspection depth:

Application layer

Data plane:

Distributed – new firewalls required for each VPC

Management:

Centralized using firewall vendor tools



### Distributed VPC security integrations

**AWS Network Firewall** 

Supported app: Any

TLS decryption: False

Inspection depth:


**Application layer** if not encrypted


Data plane:

Distributed

Management:

Centralized via FMS






firewall vendor tools

邻 Firewall (NO-NAT)

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### Centralized VPC security integrations




### Centralized VPC security integrations

**AWS Network Firewall** 

**Gateway Load Balancer** 

#### **Considerations:**

- Edge VPC ELB can only target IPs, not hostnames
- App VPC ELB must use NLB to provide a static IP to edge VPC ELB
- ELB can terminate TLS, but ANF can not



AWS Transit Gateway

App VPC

App VPC

App VPC

#### Considerations:

- Edge VPC ELB can only target IPs, not hostnames
- App VPC ELB must use NLB to provide a static IP as target for the Edge VPC ELB
- For TLS decryption, the firewalls behind the Gateway Load Balancer need a valid certificate, which can only be created outside of ACM

#### Use case example 1

Application type HTTPS

Control plane & data plane


Distributed


Inspection depth

Application-aware


**AWS WAF** 

**ELB SANDWICH** 





#### **Gateway Load Balancer**





#### Use case example 2

Application type
TCP [non-HTTP(S)]


Control plane & data plane

Centralized

Inspection depth


Network

#### **AWS Network Firewall**




\* ELB can only target IP in app VPC

#### **Gateway Load Balancer**



\* ELB can only target IP in app VPC

#### **ELB** sandwich



\* Some firewall vendors can target a hostname









## Thank you!

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