AWS Key Management Service
Cryptographic Details

August 2018
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Abstract

AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) provides cryptographic keys and operations secured by FIPS 140-2 [1] certified hardware security modules (HSMs) scaled for the cloud. AWS KMS keys and functionality are used by multiple AWS Cloud services, and you can use them to protect data in your applications. This whitepaper provides details on the cryptographic operations that are executed within AWS when you use AWS KMS.

Introduction

AWS KMS provides a web interface to generate and manage cryptographic keys and operates as a cryptographic service provider for protecting data. AWS KMS offers traditional key management services integrated with AWS services to provide a consistent view of customers’ keys across AWS, with centralized management and auditing. This whitepaper provides a detailed description of the cryptographic operations of AWS KMS to assist you in evaluating the features offered by the service.

AWS KMS includes a web interface through the AWS Management Console, command line interface, and RESTful API operations to request cryptographic
operations of a distributed fleet of FIPS 140-2 validated hardware security modules (HSM)[1]. The AWS Key Management Service HSM is a multichip standalone hardware cryptographic appliance designed to provide dedicated cryptographic functions to meet the security and scalability requirements of AWS KMS. You can establish your own HSM-based cryptographic hierarchy under keys that you manage as customer master keys (CMKs). These keys are made available only on the HSMs for the necessary cycles needed to process your cryptographic request. You can create multiple CMKs, each represented by its key ID. You can define access controls on who can manage and/or use CMKs by creating a policy that is attached to the key. This allows you to define application-specific uses for your keys for each API operation.

![AWS KMS Architecture](image)

**Figure 1: AWS KMS architecture**

AWS KMS is a tiered service consisting of web-facing KMS hosts and a tier of HSMs. The grouping of these tiered hosts forms the AWS KMS stack. All requests to AWS KMS must be made over the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS) and terminate on an AWS KMS host. AWS KMS hosts only allow TLS with a ciphersuite that provides perfect forward secrecy[2]. The AWS KMS hosts use protocols and procedures defined within this whitepaper to fulfill those requests through the HSMs. AWS KMS authenticates and authorizes your requests using the same credential and policy mechanisms that are available for all other AWS API operations, including AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM).
Design Goals

AWS KMS is designed to meet the following requirements.

**Durability:** The durability of cryptographic keys is designed to equal that of the highest durability services in AWS. A single cryptographic key can encrypt large volumes of customer data accumulated over a long time period. However, data encrypted under a key becomes irretrievable if the key is lost.

**Quorum-based access:** Multiple Amazon employees with role-specific access are required to perform administrative actions on the HSMs. There is no mechanism to export plaintext CMKs. The confidentiality of your cryptographic keys is crucial.

**Access control:** Use of keys is protected by access control policies defined and managed by you.

**Low-latency and high throughput:** AWS KMS provides cryptographic operations at latency and throughput levels suitable for use by other services in AWS.

**Regional independence:** AWS provides regional independence for customer data. Key usage is isolated within an AWS Region.

**Secure source of random numbers:** Because strong cryptography depends on truly unpredictable random number generation, AWS provides a high-quality and validated source of random numbers.

**Audit:** AWS records the use of cryptographic keys in AWS CloudTrail logs. You can use AWS CloudTrail logs to inspect use of your cryptographic keys, including use of keys by AWS services on your behalf.

To achieve these goals, the AWS KMS system includes a set of KMS operators and service host operators (collectively, “operators”) that administer “domains.” A domain is a regionally defined set of AWS KMS servers, HSMs, and operators. Each KMS operator has a hardware token that contains a private and public key pair used to authenticate its actions. The HSMs have an additional private and
public key pair to establish encryption keys that protect HSM state synchronization.

This whitepaper illustrates how the AWS KMS protects your keys and other data that you want to encrypt. Throughout this document, encryption keys or data you want to encrypt are referred to as “secrets” or “secret material.”

Background

This section contains a description of the cryptographic primitives and where they are used. In addition, it introduces the basic elements of AWS KMS.

Cryptographic Primitives

AWS KMS uses configurable cryptographic algorithms so that the system can quickly migrate from one approved algorithm, or mode, to another. The initial default set of cryptographic algorithms has been selected from Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS-approved) algorithms for their security properties and performance.

Entropy and Random Number Generation

AWS KMS key generation is performed on the KMS HSMs. The HSMs implement a hybrid random number generator that uses the NIST SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) CTR_DRBG using AES-256[3]. It is seeded with a nondeterministic random bit generator with 384-bits of entropy and updated with additional entropy to provide prediction resistance on every call for cryptographic material.

Encryption

All symmetric key encrypt commands used within HSMs use the Advanced Encryption Standards (AES) [4], in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [5] using 256-bit keys. The analogous calls to decrypt use the inverse function.

AES-GCM is an authenticated encryption scheme. In addition to encrypting plaintext to produce ciphertext, it computes an authentication tag over the ciphertext and any additional data over which authentication is required (additionally authenticated data, or AAD). The authentication tag helps ensure
that the data is from the purported source and that the ciphertext, and AAD, have
not been modified.

Frequently, AWS omits the inclusion of the AAD in our descriptions, especially
when referring to the encryption of data keys. It is implied by surrounding text in
these cases that the structure to be encrypted is partitioned between the plaintext
to be encrypted and the cleartext AAD to be protected.

AWS KMS provides an option for you to import CMK key material instead of
relying on the service to generate the key. This imported key material can be
encrypted using RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 or RSAES-OAEP \[6\] to protect the key
during transport to the KMS HSM. The RSA key pairs are generated on KMS
HSMs. The imported key material is decrypted on a KMS HSM, and reencrypted
under AES-GCM before being stored by the service.

**Key Derivation Functions**
A key derivation function is used to derive additional keys from an initial secret
or key. AWS KMS uses a key derivation function (KDF) to derive per-call keys for
every encryption under a CMK. All KDF operations use the KDF in counter mode
\[7\] using HMAC [FIPS197][8] with SHA256 [FIPS180][9]. The 256-bit derived
key is used with AES-GCM to encrypt or decrypt customer data and keys.

**Digital Signatures**
All service entities have an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) key
pair. They perform ECDSA as defined in Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)[10] and X9.62-2005:
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)[11]. The entities use the secure hash
algorithm defined in Federal Information Processing Standards Publications,
FIPS PUB 180-4 [9], known as SHA384. The keys are generated on the curve
secp384r1 (NIST-P384) [12].

Digital signatures are used to authenticate commands and communications
between AWS KMS entities. A key pair is denoted as \((d, Q)\), the signing operation
as \(\text{Sig} = \text{Sign}(d, \text{msg})\), and the verify operation as \(\text{Verify}(Q, \text{msg}, \text{Sig})\). The verify
operation returns an indication of success or failure.
It is frequently convenient to represent an entity by its public key $Q$. In these cases, the identifying information, such as an identifier or a role, is assumed to accompany the public key.

**Key Establishment**

AWS KMS uses two different key establishment methods. The first is defined as $C(1, 2, \text{ECC DH})$ in *Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revision 2)* [13]. This scheme has an initiator with a static signing key. The initiator generates and signs an ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) key, intended for a recipient with a static ECDH agreement key. This method uses one ephemeral key and two static keys using ECDH. That is the derivation of the label $C(1, 2, \text{ECC DH})$. This method is sometimes called one-pass ECDH.

The second key establishment method is $C(2, 2, \text{ECC, DH})$ [13]. In this scheme, both parties have a static signing key, and they generate, sign, and exchange an ephemeral ECDH key. This method uses two static keys and two ephemeral keys using ECDH. That is the derivation of the label $C(2, 2, \text{ECC, DH})$. This method is sometimes called ECDH ephemeral or ECDHE. All ECDH keys are generated on the curve *secp384r1 (NIST-P384)* [12].

**Envelope Encryption**

A basic construction used within many cryptographic systems is envelope encryption. Envelope encryption uses two or more cryptographic keys to secure a message. Typically, one key is derived from a longer-term static key $k$, and another key is a per-message key, $msgKey$, which is generated to encrypt the message. The envelope is formed by encrypting the message, $ciphertext = Encrypt(msgKey, message)$, encrypting the message key with the long-term static key, $encKey = Encrypt(k, msgKey)$, and packaging the two values ($encKey$, $ciphertext$) into a single structure, or envelope encrypted message.

The recipient, with access to $k$, can open the enveloped message by first decrypting the encrypted key and then decrypting the message.

AWS KMS provides the ability to manage these longer-term static keys and automate the process of envelope encryption of your data.
AWS KMS uses envelope encryption internally to secure confidential material between service endpoints.

In addition to the encryption capabilities provided within the KMS service, the AWS Encryption SDK [14] provides client-side envelope encryption libraries. You can use these libraries to protect your data and the encryption keys used to encrypt that data.

**Basic Concepts**

This section introduces some basic AWS KMS concepts that are elaborated on throughout this whitepaper.

**Customer master key (CMK):** A logical key that represents the top of your key hierarchy. A CMK is given an Amazon Resource Name (ARN) that includes a unique key identifier, or *key ID*.

**Alias:** A user-friendly name, or *alias*, can be associated with a CMK. The alias can be used interchangeably with *key ID* in many of the AWS KMS API operations.

**Permissions:** A policy attached to a CMK that defines permissions on the key. The default policy allows any principals that you define, as well as allowing the AWS account root user to add IAM policies that reference the key.

**Grants:** Grants are intended to allow delegated use of CMKs when the duration of usage is not known at the outset. One use of grants is to define scoped-down permissions for an AWS service. The service uses your key to do asynchronous work on your behalf on encrypted data in the absence of a direct-signed API call from you.

**Data keys:** Cryptographic keys generated on HSMs under a CMK. AWS KMS allows authorized entities to obtain data keys protected by a CMK. They can be returned both as plaintext (unencrypted) data keys and as encrypted data keys.

**Ciphertexts:** Encrypted output of AWS KMS is referred to as *customer ciphertext* or just *ciphertext* when there is no confusion. Ciphertext contains
encrypted data with additional information that identifies the CMK to use in the decryption process.

**Encryption context:** A key–value pair map of additional information associated with AWS KMS–protected information. AWS KMS uses authenticated encryption to protect data keys. The encryption context is incorporated into the AAD of the authenticated encryption in AWS KMS–encrypted ciphertexts. This context information is optional and not returned when requesting a key (or an encryption operation). But if used this context value is required to successfully complete a decryption operation. An intended use of the encryption context is to provide additional authenticated information that can be used to enforce policies and be included in the AWS CloudTrail logs. For example, a key–value pair of {"key name": "satellite uplink key"} could be used to name the data key. Subsequently, whenever the key is used, a AWS CloudTrail entry is made that includes “key name”: “satellite uplink key.” This additional information can provide useful context to understand why a given master key was used.

**Customer’s Key Hierarchy**

Your key hierarchy starts with a top-level logical key, a CMK. A CMK represents a container for top-level key material and is uniquely defined within the AWS service namespace with an ARN. The ARN includes a uniquely generated key identifier, a CMK key ID. A CMK is created based on a user-initiated request through AWS KMS. Upon reception, AWS KMS requests the creation of an initial HSM backing key (HBK) to be placed into the CMK container. All such HSM-resident-only keys are denoted in red. The HBK is generated on an HSM in the domain and is designed never to be exported from the HSM in plaintext. Instead, the HBK is exported encrypted under HSM-managed domain keys. These exported HBKs are referred to as exported key tokens (EKTs).

The EKT is exported to a highly durable, low-latency storage. You receive an ARN to the logical CMK. This represents the top of a key hierarchy, or cryptographic context, for you. You can create multiple CMKs within your account and set policies on your CMKs like any other AWS-named resource.

Within the hierarchy of a specific CMK, the HBK can be thought of as a version of the CMK. When you want to rotate the CMK through AWS KMS, a new HBK is created and associated with the CMK as the active HBK for the CMK. The older
HBKs are preserved and can be used to decrypt and verify previously protected data, but only the active cryptographic key can be used to protect new information.

![CMK hierarchy diagram](image)

Figure 2: CMK hierarchy

You can make requests through AWS KMS to use your CMKs to directly protect information or request additional HSM-generated keys protected under your CMK. These keys are called customer data keys, or CDKs. CDKs can be returned encrypted as ciphertext (CT), in plaintext, or both. All objects encrypted under a CMK (either customer-supplied data or HSM-generated keys) can be decrypted only on an HSM via a call through AWS KMS.

The returned ciphertext, or the decrypted payload, is never stored within AWS KMS. The information is returned to you over your TLS connection to AWS KMS. This also applies to calls made by AWS services on your behalf.

We summarize the key hierarchy and the specific key properties in the following table.
## Use Cases

This whitepaper presents two use cases. The first demonstrates how AWS KMS performs server-side encryption with CMKs on an Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volume. The second is a client-side application that demonstrates how you can use envelope encryption to protect content with AWS KMS.

### Amazon EBS Volume Encryption

Amazon EBS offers volume encryption capability. Each volume is encrypted using **AES-256-XTS [15]**. This requires two 256-bit volume keys, which you can think of as one 512-bit volume key. The volume key is encrypted under a CMK in your account. For Amazon EBS to encrypt a volume for you, it must have access to generate a volume key (VK) under a CMK in the account. You do this by providing a grant for Amazon EBS to the CMK to create data keys and to encrypt and decrypt these volume keys. Now Amazon EBS uses AWS KMS with a CMK to generate AWS KMS–encrypted volume keys.

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1. AWS KMS may from time to time relax domain key rotation to at most weekly to account for domain administration and configuration tasks.
2. Default service master keys created and managed by AWS KMS on your behalf are automatically rotated every 3 years.
Encrypting data being written to an Amazon EBS volume involves five steps:

1. Amazon EBS obtains an encrypted volume key under a CMK through AWS KMS over a TLS session and stores the encrypted key with the volume metadata.

2. When the Amazon EBS volume is mounted, the encrypted volume key is retrieved.

3. A call to AWS KMS over TLS is made to decrypt the encrypted volume key. AWS KMS identifies the CMK and makes an internal request to an HSM in the fleet to decrypt the encrypted volume key. AWS KMS then returns the volume key back to the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) host that contains your instance over the TLS session.

4. The volume key is used to encrypt and decrypt all data going to and from the attached Amazon EBS volume. Amazon EBS retains the encrypted volume key for later use in case the volume key in memory is no longer available.
Client-side Encryption

The AWS Encryption SDK [14] includes an API operation for performing envelope encryption using a CMK from AWS KMS. For complete recommendations and usage details see the related documentation [14]. Client applications can use the AWS Encryption SDK to perform envelope encryption using AWS KMS.

```java
// Instantiate the SDK
final AwsCrypto crypto = new AwsCrypto();
// Set up the KmsMasterKeyProvider backed by the default credentials
final KmsMasterKeyProvider prov = new KmsMasterKeyProvider(keyId);
// Do the encryption
final byte[] ciphertext = crypto.encryptData(prov, message);
```

The client application can execute the following steps:

1. A request is made under a CMK for a new data key. An encrypted data key and a plaintext version of the data key are returned.
2. Within the AWS Encryption SDK, the plaintext data key is used to encrypt the message. The plaintext data key is then deleted from memory.
3. The encrypted data key and encrypted message are combined into a single ciphertext byte array.

![Diagram of AWS Encryption SDK envelope encryption](image)

Figure 4: AWS Encryption SDK envelope encryption
The envelope-encrypted message can be decrypted using the decrypt functionality to obtain the originally encrypted message.

```java
final AwsCrypto crypto = new AwsCrypto();
final KmsMasterKeyProvider prov = new KmsMasterKeyProvider(keyId);
// Decrypt the data
final CryptoResult<byte[], KmsMasterKey> res =
crypto.decryptData(prov, ciphertext);
// We need to check the master key to ensure that the
// assumed key was used
if (!res.getMasterKeyIds().get(0).equals(keyId)) {
    throw new IllegalStateException("Wrong key id!");
}
byte[] plaintext = res.getResult();
```

1. The AWS Encryption SDK parses the envelope-encrypted message to obtain the encrypted data key and make a request to AWS KMS to decrypt the data key.
2. The AWS Encryption SDK receives the plaintext data key from AWS KMS.
3. The data key is then used to decrypt the message, returning the initial plaintext.

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**Figure 5: AWS Encryption SDK envelope decryption**
Customer Master Keys

A CMK refers to a logical key that may refer to one or more HBKs. It is generated as a result of a call to the CreateKey API call.

The following is the CreateKey request syntax.

```json
{
  "Description": "string",
  "KeyUsage": "string",
  "Origin": "string",
  "Policy": "string"
}
```

The request accepts the following data in JSON format.

**Optional Description:** Description of the key. We recommend that you choose a description that helps you decide whether the key is appropriate for a task.

**Optional KeyUsage:** Specifies the intended use of the key. Currently this defaults to “ENCRYPT/DECRYPT”, since only symmetric encryption and decryption are supported.

**Optional Origin:** The source of the CMK's key material. The default is “AWS_KMS”. In addition to the default value “AWS_KMS”, the value “EXTERNAL” may be used to create a CMK without key material so that you can import key material from your existing key management infrastructure. The use of EXTERNAL is covered in the following section on Imported Master Keys.

**Optional Policy:** Policy to attach to the key. If the policy is omitted, the key is created with the default policy (below) that enables IAM users with AWS KMS permissions, as well as the root account to manage it.

For details on the policy, see [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/key-policies.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/key-policies.html).
The call returns a response containing an ARN with the key identifier.

```
arn:aws:kms:<region>:<owningAWSAccountld>:key/<keyld>
```

If the Origin is AWS KMS, after the ARN is created, a request to an HSM is made over an authenticated session to provision an HBK. The HBK is a 256-bit key that is associated with this CMK key ID. It can be generated only on an HSM and is designed never to be exported outside of the HSM boundary in cleartext. An HBK is generated on the HSM and encrypted under the current domain key DK0. These encrypted HBKs are referred to as EKTs. Although the HSMs can be configured to use a variety of key wrapping methods, the current implementation uses the authenticated encryption scheme known as AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [5]. As part of the authenticated encryption mode, some cleartext exported key token metadata can be protected.

This is stylistically represented as \( EKT = Encrypt(DK_0, HBK) \).

Two fundamental forms of protection are provided to your CMKs and the subsequent HBKs: authorization policies set on your CMKs, and the cryptographic protections on your associated HBKs. The remaining sections describe the cryptographic protections and the security of the management functions in AWS KMS.

In addition to the ARN, a user-friendly name can be associated with the CMK by creating an alias for the key. Once an alias has been associated with a CMK, the alias can be used in place of the ARN.

Multiple levels of authorizations surround the use of CMKs. AWS KMS enables separate authorization policies between the encrypted content and the CMK. For instance, an AWS KMS envelope-encrypted Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) object inherits the policy on the Amazon S3 bucket. However, access to the necessary encryption key is determined by the access policy on the CMK.
For the latest information about authentication and authorization policies for AWS KMS, see https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/control-access.html.

Imported Master Keys

AWS KMS provides a mechanism for importing the cryptographic material used for an HBK. As described in the section on Customer Master Keys earlier, when the CreateKey command is used with Origin set to EXTERNAL, a logical CMK is created that contains no underlying HBK. The cryptographic material must be imported using the ImportKeyMaterial API call. This feature allows you to control the key creation and durability of the cryptographic material. It is recommended that if you use this feature you take significant caution in the handling and durability of these keys in your environment. For complete details and recommendations for importing master keys, see https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/importing-keys.html.

GetParametersForImport

Prior to importing the key material for an imported master key, you must obtain the necessary parameters to import the key.

The following is the GetParametersForImport request syntax.

```json
{
   "KeyId": "string",
   "WrappingAlgorithm": "string",
   "WrappingKeySpec": "string"
}
```

KeyId: A unique key identifier for a CMK. This value can be a globally unique identifier, an ARN, or an alias.

WrappingAlgorithm: The algorithm you use when you encrypt your key material. The valid values are “RSAES_OAEP_SHA256”, “RSAES_OAEP_SHA1”, or “RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5”. AWS KMS recommends that you use
RSAES_OAEP_SHA256. You may have to use another key-wrapping algorithm, depending on what your key management infrastructure supports.

**WrappingKeySpec:** The type of wrapping key (public key) to return in the response. Only RSA 2048-bit public keys are supported. The only valid value is “RSA_2048”.

This call results in a request from the AWS KMS host to an HSM to generate a new RSA 2048-bit key pair. This key pair is used to import an HBK for the specified CMK key ID. The private key is protected and accessible only by an HSM member of the domain.

A successful call results in the following return values.

```
{
  "ImportToken": blob,
  "KeyId": "string",
  "PublicKey": blob,
  "ValidTo": number
}
```

**ImportToken:** A token that contains metadata to ensure that your key material is imported correctly. Store this value and send it in a subsequent ImportKeyMaterial request.

**KeyId:** The CMK to use when you subsequently import the key material. This is the same CMK specified in the request.

**PublicKey:** The public key to use to encrypt your key material. The public key is encoded as specified in section A.1.1 of [PKCS#1](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447), an ASN.1 DER encoding of the RSAPublicKey. It is the ASN.1 encoding of two integers as an ASN.1 sequence.

**ValidTo:** The time at which the import token and public key expire. These items are valid for 24 hours. If you do not use them for a subsequent ImportKeyMaterial request within 24 hours, you must retrieve new ones. The import token and public key from the same response must be used together.
ImportKeyMaterial

The ImportKeyMaterial request imports the necessary cryptographic material for the HKP. The cryptographic material must be a 256-bit symmetric key. It must be encrypted using the algorithm specified in WrappingAlgorithm under the returned public key from a recent GetParametersForImport request.

ImportKeyMaterial takes the following arguments.

```json
{
   "EncryptedKey": blob,
   "ExpirationModel": "string",
   "ImportToken": blob,
   "KeyId": "string",
   "ValidTo": number
}
```

**EncryptedKey**: The encrypted key material. Encrypt the key material with the algorithm that you specified in a previous GetParametersForImport request and the public key that you received in the response to that request.

**ExpirationModel**: Specifies whether the key material expires. When this value is KEY_MATERIAL_EXPIRES, the ValidTo parameter must contain an expiration date. When this value is KEY_MATERIAL_DOES_NOT_EXPIRE, do not include the ValidTo parameter. The valid values are “KEY_MATERIAL_EXPIRES” and “KEY_MATERIAL_DOES_NOT_EXPIRE”.

**ImportToken**: The import token you received in a previous GetParametersForImport response. Use the import token from the same response that contained the public key that you used to encrypt the key material.

**KeyId**: The CMK to import key material into. The CMK's Origin must be EXTERNAL.

**Optional ValidTo**: The time at which the imported key material expires. When the key material expires, AWS KMS deletes the key material and the CMK.
becomes unusable. You must omit this parameter when `ExpirationModel` is set to `KEY_MATERIAL_DOES_NOT_EXPIRE`. Otherwise it is required.

On success, the CMK is available for use within AWS KMS until the specified validity date. Once an imported CMK expires, the EKT is deleted from the service’s storage layer.

**Enable and Disable Key**

The ability to enable or disable a CMK is separate from the key lifecycle. This does not modify the actual state of the key but instead suspends the ability to use all HBKs that are tied to a CMK. These are simple commands that take just the CMK key ID.

![Figure 6: AWS KMS CMK lifecycle](image)

**Key Deletion**

You can delete a CMK and all associated HBKs. This is an inherently destructive operation, and you should exercise caution when deleting keys from KMS. AWS KMS enforces a minimal wait time of seven days when deleting CMKs. During the waiting period the key is placed in a disabled state with a key state indicating Pending Deletion. All calls to use the key for cryptographic operations will fail.

---

3 The lifecycle for an EXTERNAL CMK differs. It can be in the state of pending import, and key rotation is not currently available. Further, the EKT can be removed without requiring a waiting period by calling `DeleteImportedKeyMaterial`. 
CMKs can be deleted using the ScheduleKeyDeletion API call. It takes the following arguments.

```json
{
    "KeyId": "string",
    "PendingWindowInDays": number
}
```

**KeyId:** The unique identifier for the CMK to delete. To specify this value, use the unique key ID or the ARN of the CMK.

**Optional PendingWindowInDays:** The waiting period, specified in number of days. After the waiting period ends, AWS KMS deletes the CMK and all associated HBKs. This value is optional. If you include a value, it must be between 7 and 30, inclusive. If you do not include a value, it defaults to 30.

**Rotate Customer Master Key**

You can induce a rotation of your CMK. The current system allows you to opt in to a yearly rotation schedule for your CMK. When a CMK is rotated, a new HBK is created and marked as the active key for all new requests to protect information. The current active key is moved to the deactivated state and remains available for use to decrypt any existing ciphertext values that have been encrypted using this version of the HBK. AWS KMS does not store any ciphertext values encrypted under a CMK. As a direct consequence, these ciphertext values require the deactivated HBK to decrypt. These older ciphertexts can be re-encrypted to the new HBK by calling the ReEncrypt API call.

You can set up key rotation using a simple API call or from the AWS Management Console.

**Customer Data Operations**

After you have established a CMK, it can be used to perform cryptographic operations. Whenever data is encrypted under a CMK, the resulting object is a customer ciphertext. The ciphertext contains two sections: an unencrypted
header (or cleartext) portion, protected by the authenticated encryption scheme as the additional authenticated data, and an encrypted portion. The cleartext portion includes the HBK identifier (HBKID). These two immutable fields of the ciphertext value help ensure that AWS KMS can decrypt the object in the future.

**Generating Data Keys**

A request can be made for a specific type of data key or a random key of arbitrary length through the GenerateDataKey API call. A simplified view of this API operation is provided here and in other examples. You can find a detailed description of the full API here [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/Welcome.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/Welcome.html).

The following is the GenerateDataKey request syntax.

```
{
    "EncryptionContext": {"string" : "string"},
    "GrantTokens": ["string"],
    "KeyId": "string",
    "KeySpec": "string",
    "NumberOfBytes": "number"
}
```

The request accepts the following data in JSON format.

**Optional EncryptionContext:** Name:value pair that contains additional data to authenticate during the encryption and decryption processes that use the key.

**Optional GrantTokens:** A list of grant tokens that represent grants that provide permissions to generate or use a key. For more information on grants and grant tokens, see [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/control-access.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/control-access.html).

**Optional KeySpec:** A value that identifies the encryption algorithm and key size. Currently this can be `AES_128` or `AES_256`. 
Optional NumberOfBytes: An integer that contains the number of bytes to generate.

AWS KMS, after authenticating the command, acquires the current active EKT pertaining to the CMK. It passes the EKT along with your provided request and any encryption context to an HSM over a protected session between the AWS KMS host and an HSM in the domain.

The HSM does the following:

1. Generates the requested secret material and hold it in volatile memory.
2. Decrypts the EKT matching the key ID of the CMK that is defined in the request to obtain the active $HK = \text{Decrypt}(DK_i, \text{EKT})$.
3. Generates a random nonce $N$.
4. Derives a 256-bit AES-GCM Data Encryption Key $K$ from $HK$ and $N$.
5. Encrypts the secret material $\text{ciphertext} = \text{Encrypt}(K, \text{context}, \text{secret})$.

The ciphertext value is returned to you and is not retained anywhere in the AWS infrastructure. Without possession of the ciphertext, the encryption context, and the authorization to use the CMK, the underlying secret cannot be returned.

The GenerateDataKey returns the plaintext secret material and the ciphertext to you over the secure channel between the AWS KMS host and the HSM. AWS KMS then sends it to you over the TLS session.

The following is the response syntax.

```json
{
    "CiphertextBlob": "blob",
    "KeyId": "string",
    "Plaintext": "blob"
}
```

The management of data keys is left to you as the application developer. They can be rotated at any frequency. Further, the data key itself can be reencrypted to
a different CMK or a rotated CMK using the ReEncrypt API operation. Full
details can be found here:

Encrypt

A basic function of AWS KMS is to encrypt an object under a CMK. By design,
AWS KMS provides low latency cryptographic operations on HSMs. Thus there is
a limit of 4 KB on the amount of plaintext that can be encrypted in a direct call to
the encrypt function. The KMS Encryption SDK can be used to encrypt larger
messages. AWS KMS, after authenticating the command, acquires the current
active EKT pertaining to the CMK. It passes the EKT along with the plaintext
provided by you and encryption context to any available HSM in the region over
an authenticated session between the AWS KMS host and an HSM in the domain.

The HSM executes the following:

1. Decrypts the EKT to obtain the $HBK = Decrypt(DK_i, EKT)$.
2. Generates a random nonce $N$.
3. Derives a 256-bit AES-GCM Data Encryption Key $K$ from $HBK$ and $N$.
4. Encrypts the plaintext $ciphertext = Encrypt(K, context, plaintext)$.

The ciphertext value is returned to you, and neither the plaintext data or
ciphertext is retained anywhere in the AWS infrastructure. Without possession of
the ciphertext and the encryption context, and the authorization to use the CMK,
the underlying plaintext cannot be returned.

Decrypt

A call to AWS KMS to decrypt a ciphertext value accepts an encrypted value
ciphertext and an encryption context. AWS KMS authenticates the call using
AWS signature version 4 signed requests [16] and extracts the HBKID for the
wrapping key from the ciphertext. The HBKID is used to obtain the EKT
required to decrypt the ciphertext, the key ID, and the policy for the key ID. The
request is authorized based on the key policy, grants that may be present, and any
associated IAM policies that reference the key ID. The Decrypt function is
analogous to the encryption function.
The following is the **Decrypt** request syntax.

```json
{
    "CiphertextBlob": "blob",
    "EncryptionContext": { "string" : "string" }
    "GrantTokens": ["string"]
}
```

The following are the request parameters.

**CiphertextBlob**: Ciphertext including metadata.

**Optional EncryptionContext**: The encryption context. If this was specified in the **Encrypt** function, it must be specified here or the decryption operation fails. For more information, see https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/encrypt-context.html.

**Optional GrantTokens**: A list of grant tokens that represent grants that provide permissions to perform decryption.

The *ciphertext* and the *EKT* are sent, along with the encryption context, over an authenticated session to an HSM for decryption.

The HSM executes the following:

1. Decrypts the *EKT* to obtain the $HBK = Decrypt(DKi, EKT)$.
2. Extracts the nonce $N$ from the *ciphertext* structure.
3. Regenerates a 256-bit AES-GCM Data Encryption Key $K$ from $HBK$ and $N$.
4. Decrypts the *ciphertext* to obtain $plaintext = Decrypt(K, context, ciphertext)$. 
The resulting key ID and plaintext are returned to the AWS KMS host over the secure session and then back to the calling customer application over a TLS connection.

The following is the response syntax.

```
{
  "KeyId": "string",
  "Plaintext": blob
}
```

If the calling application wants to ensure that the authenticity of the plaintext, it must verify the key ID returned is the one expected.

**Re-Encrypting an Encrypted Object**

An existing customer ciphertext encrypted under one CMK can be reencrypted to another CMK through a re-encrypt command. Reencrypt encrypts data on the server side with a new CMK without exposing the plaintext of the key on the client side. The data is first decrypted and then encrypted.

The following is the request syntax.

```
{
  "CiphertextBlob": "blob",
  "DestinationEncryptionContext": { "string" : "string" },
  "DestinationKeyId": "string",
  "GrantTokens": ["string"],
  "SourceEncryptionContext": { "string" : "string"}
}
```

The request accepts the following data in JSON format.

**CiphertextBlob**: Ciphertext of the data to reencrypt.
Optional DestinationEncryptionContext: Encryption context to be used when the data is reencrypted.

DestinationKeyId: Key identifier of the key used to reencrypt the data.

Optional GrantTokens: A list of grant tokens that represent grants that provide permissions to perform decryption.

Optional SourceEncryptionContext: Encryption context used to encrypt and decrypt the data specified in the CiphertextBlob parameter.

The process combines the decrypt and encrypt operations of the previous descriptions: The customer ciphertext is decrypted under the initial HBK referenced by the customer ciphertext to the current HBK under the intended CMK. When the CMKs used in this command are the same, this command moves the customer ciphertext from an old version of an HBK to the latest version of an HBK.

The following is the response syntax.

```json
{
   "CiphertextBlob": blob,
   "KeyId": "string",
   "SourceKeyId": "string"
}
```

If the calling application wants to ensure the authenticity of the underlying plaintext, it must verify the SourceKeyId returned is the one expected.

Domains and the Domain State

A cooperative collection of trusted internal AWS KMS entities within an AWS Region is referred to as a domain. A domain includes a set of trusted entities, a set of rules, and a set of secret keys, called domain keys. The domain keys are shared among HSMs that are members of the domain. A domain state consists of the following fields.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>A domain name to identify this domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>A list of HSMs that are members of the domain, including their public signing key and public agreement keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>A list of entities, public signing keys, and a role (KMS operator or service host) that represents the operators of this service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>A list of quorum rules for each command that must be satisfied to execute a command on the HSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain keys</td>
<td>A list of domain keys (symmetric keys) currently in use within the domain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The full domain state is available only on the HSM. The domain state is synchronized between HSM domain members as an exported domain token.

## Domain Keys

All the HSMs in a domain share a set of domain keys, \( \{DK_r\} \). These keys are shared through a domain state export routine. The exported domain state can be imported into any HSM that is a member of the domain. How this is accomplished and the additional contents of the domain state are detailed in a following section on Managing Domain State.

The set of domain keys, \( \{DK_r\} \), always includes one active domain key, and several deactivated domain keys. Domain keys are rotated daily to ensure that we comply with Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1 [17]. During domain key rotation, all existing CMK keys encrypted under the outgoing domain key are reencrypted under the new active domain key. The active domain key is used to encrypt any new EKTs. The expired domain keys can be used only to decrypt previously encrypted EKTs for a number of days equivalent to the number of recently rotated domain keys.

## Exported Domain Tokens

There is a regular need to synchronize state between domain participants. This is accomplished through exporting the domain state whenever a change is made to the domain. The domain state is exported as an exported domain token.
### Field Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>A domain name to identify this domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>A list of HSMs that are members of the domain, including their signing and agreement public keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>A list of entities, public signing keys, and a role that represents the operators of this service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>A list of quorum rules for each command that must be satisfied to execute a command on an HSM domain member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encrypted domain keys</td>
<td>Envelope-encrypted domain keys. The domain keys are encrypted by the signing member for each of the members listed above, enveloped to their public agreement key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>A signature on the domain state produced by an HSM, necessarily a member of the domain that exported the domain state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exported domain token forms the fundamental source of trust for entities operating within the domain.

### Managing Domain State

The domain state is managed through quorum-authenticated commands. These changes include modifying the list of trusted participants in the domain, modifying the quorum rules for executing HSM commands, and periodically rotating the domain keys. These commands are authenticated on a per-command basis as opposed to authenticated session operations; see the API model depicted in Figure 7.

An HSM, in its initialized and operational state, contains a set of self-generated asymmetric identity keys, a signing key pair, and a key-establishment key pair. Through a manual process, a KMS operator can establish an initial domain to be created on a first HSM in a region. This initial domain consists of a full domain state as defined in Domains and the domain state section. It is installed through a join command to each of the defined HSM members in the domain.

After an HSM has joined an initial domain, it is bound to the rules defined in that domain. These rules govern the commands that use customer cryptographic keys or make changes to the host or domain state. The authenticated session API operations that use your cryptographic keys have been defined earlier.
Figure 9: Domain management

Figure 9 depicts how a domain state gets modified. It consists of four steps:

1. A quorum-based command is sent to an HSM to modify the domain.

2. A new domain state is generated and exported as a new exported domain token. The state on the HSM is not modified, meaning that the change is not enacted on the HSM.

3. A second command is sent to each of the HSMs in the newly exported domain token to update their domain state with the new domain token.

4. The HSMs listed in the new exported domain token can authenticate the command and the domain token. They can also unpack the domain keys to update the domain state on all HSMs in the domain.

HSMs do not communicate directly with each other. Instead, a quorum of operators requests a change to the domain state that results in a new exported domain token. A service host member of the domain is used to distribute the new domain state to every HSM in the domain.

The leaving and joining of a domain are done through the HSM management functions, and the modification of the domain state is done through the domain management functions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description of HSM management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leave domain</td>
<td>Causes an HSM to leave a domain, deleting all remnants and keys of that domain from memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join domain</td>
<td>Causes an HSM to join a new domain or update its current domain state to the new domain state, using the existing domain as source of the initial set of rules to authenticate this message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create domain</td>
<td>Causes a new domain to be created on an HSM. Returns a first domain token that can be distributed to member HSMs of the domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modify operators</td>
<td>Adds or removes operators from the list of authorized operators and their roles in the domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modify members</td>
<td>Adds or removes an HSM from the list of authorized HSMs in the domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modify rules</td>
<td>Modifies the set of quorum rules required to execute commands on an HSM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotate domain keys</td>
<td>Causes a new domain key to be created and marked as the active domain key. This moves the existing active key to a deactivated key and removes the oldest deactivated key from the domain state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Internal Communication Security

Commands between the service hosts/KMS operators, and the HSMs are secured through two mechanisms depicted in Figure-7: a quorum-signed request method and an authenticated session using an HSM-service host protocol.

The quorum-signed commands are designed so that no single operator can modify the critical security protections provided by the HSMs. The commands executed over the authenticated sessions help ensure that only authorized service operators can perform operations involving CMKs. All customer-bound secret information is secured across the AWS infrastructure.

HSM Security Boundary

The inner security boundary of AWS KMS is the HSM. The HSM has a limited web-based API and no other active physical interfaces in its operational state. An operational HSM is provisioned during initialization with the necessary cryptographic keys to establish its role in the domain. Sensitive cryptographic materials of the HSM are only stored in volatile memory and erased when the
HSM moves out of the operational state, including intended or unintended shutdowns or resets.

The HSM API operations are authenticated either by individual commands or over a mutually authenticated confidential session established by a service host.

![Figure 7: HSM API operations](image)

### Quorum-Signed Commands

Quorum-signed commands are issued by operators to HSMs. This section describes how quorum-based commands are created, signed, and authenticated. These rules are fairly simple. For example, command *Foo* requires two members from role *Bar* to be authenticated. There are three steps in the creation and verification of a quorum-based command. The first step is the initial command creation; the second is the submission to additional operators to sign; and the third is the verification and execution.

For the purpose of introducing the concepts, assume that there is an authentic set of operator’s public keys and roles \{QOS\}, and a set of quorum-rules \(QR = \{\text{Command}_i, \{\text{Rule}_{(i,t)}\}\}\) where each Rule is a set of roles and minimum number \(N_{(\text{Role}_t ,N_t )}\). For a command to satisfy the quorum rule, the command dataset must be signed by a set of operators listed in \{QOS\}, such that they meet one of the rules listed for that command. As mentioned earlier in this whitepaper, the set of quorum rules and operators are stored in the domain state and the exported domain token.

In practice, an initial signer signs the command \(\text{Sig}_1 = \text{Sign}(d_{Op1}, \text{Command})\). A second operator also signs the command \(\text{Sig}_2 = \text{Sign}(d_{Op2}, \text{Command})\). The doubly signed message is sent to an HSM for execution. The HSM performs the following:
1. For each signature, it extracts the signer’s public key from the domain state and verifies the signature on the command.

2. It verifies that the set of signers satisfies a rule for the command.

Authenticated Sessions

Your key operations are executed between the externally facing AWS KMS hosts and the HSMs. These commands pertain to the creation and use of cryptographic keys and secure random number generation. The commands execute over a session-authenticated channel between the service hosts and the HSMs. In addition to the need for authenticity, these sessions require confidentiality. Commands executing over these sessions include the returning of cleartext data keys and decrypted messages intended for you. To ensure that these sessions cannot be subverted through man-in-the-middle attacks, sessions are authenticated.

This protocol performs a mutually authenticated ECDHE key agreement between the HSM and the service host. The exchange is initiated by the service host and completed by the HSM. The HSM also returns a session key (SK) encrypted by the negotiated key and an exported key token that contains the session key. The exported key token contains a validity period, after which the service host must renegotiate a session key.

A service host is a member of the domain and has an identity-signing key pair \((dHOS_i, QHOS_i)\) and an authentic copy of the HSMs’ identity public keys. It uses its set of identity-signing keys to securely negotiate a session key that can be used between the service host and any HSM in the domain. The exported key tokens have a validity period associated with them, after which a new key must be negotiated.

Figure 8: HSM-service host operator authenticated sessions
The process begins with the service host recognition that it requires a session key to send and receive sensitive communication flows between itself and an HSM member of the domain.

1. A service host generates an ECDH ephemeral key-pair \((d_1, Q_1)\) and signs it with its identity key \(\text{Sig}_1 = \text{Sign}(d_{OS}, Q_1)\).

2. The HSM verifies the signature on the received public key using its current domain token and creates an ECDH ephemeral key-pair \((d_2, Q_2)\). It then completes the ECDH-key-exchange according to Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised) [13] to form a negotiated 256-bit AES-GCM key. The HSM generates a fresh 256-bit AES-GCM session key. It encrypts the session key with the negotiated key to form the encrypted session key (ESK). It also encrypts the session key under the domain key as an exported key token \(EKT\). Finally, it signs a return value with its identity key pair \(\text{Sig}_2 = \text{Sign}(d_{HSK}, (Q_2, ESK, EKT))\).

3. The service host verifies the signature on the received keys using its current domain token. The service host then completes the ECDH key exchange according to Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised) [13]. It next decrypts the ESK to obtain the session key \(SK\).

During the validity period in the \(EKT\), the service host can use the negotiated session key \(SK\) to send envelope-encrypted commands to the HSM. Every service-host-initiated command over this authenticated session includes the \(EKT\). The HSM responds using the same negotiated session key \(SK\).

**Durability Protection**

Additional service durability is provided by the use of offline HSMs, multiple nonvolatile storage of exported domain tokens, and redundant storage of encrypted CMKs. The offline HSMs are members of the existing domains. With the exception of not being online and participating in the regular domain operations, the offline HSMs appear identically in the domain state as the existing HSM members.
The durability design is intended to protect all CMKs in a region should AWS experience a wide-scale loss of either the online HSMs or the set of CMKs stored within our primary storage system. Imported master keys are not included under the durability protections afforded other CMKs. In the event of a regionwide failure in AWS KMS, imported master keys may need to be reimported.

The offline HSMs, and the credentials to access them, are stored in safes within monitored safe rooms in multiple independent geographical locations. Each safe requires at least one AWS security officer and one AWS KMS operator, from two independent teams in AWS, to obtain these materials. The use of these materials is governed by internal policy requiring a quorum of AWS KMS operators to be present.
References


## Appendix - Abbreviations and Keys

This section lists abbreviations and keys referenced throughout the document.

### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDK</td>
<td>customer data key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMK</td>
<td>customer master key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMKID</td>
<td>customer master key identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>domain key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDHE</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDSA</td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKT</td>
<td>exported key token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESK</td>
<td>encrypted session key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCM</td>
<td>Galois Counter Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBK</td>
<td>HSM backing key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBKID</td>
<td>HSM backing key identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSM</td>
<td>hardware security module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Rivest Shamir and Adleman (cryptologic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secp384r1</td>
<td>Standards for Efficient Cryptography prime 384-bit random curve 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA256</td>
<td>Secure Hash Algorithm of digest length 256-bits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Keys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name: Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HBK</td>
<td>HSM backing key: HSM backing keys are 256-bit master keys, from which specific use keys are derived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Domain key: A domain key is a 256-bit AES-GCM key. It is shared among all the members of a domain and is used to protect HSM backing keys material and HSM-service host session keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKEK</td>
<td>Domain key encryption key: A domain key encryption Key is an AES-256-GCM key generated on a host and used for encrypting the current set of domain keys synchronizing domain state across the HSM hosts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dHAK, QHAK)</td>
<td>HSM agreement key pair: Every initiated HSM has a locally generated Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman agreement key pair on the curve secp384r1 (NIST-P384).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dE, QE)</td>
<td>Ephemeral agreement key pair: HSM and service hosts generate ephemeral agreement keys. These are Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys on the curve secp384r1 (NIST-P384). These are generated in two use cases: to establish a host-to-host encryption key to transport domain key encryption keys in domain tokens and to establish HSM-service host session keys to protect sensitive communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dHSK, QHSK)</td>
<td>HSM signature key pair: Every initiated HSM has a locally generated Elliptic Curve Digital Signature key pair on the curve secp384r1 (NIST-P384).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dOS, QOS)</td>
<td>Operator signature key pair: Both the service host operators and KMS operators have an identity signing key used to authenticate itself to other domain participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Data encryption key: A 256-bit AES-GCM key derived from an HBK using the NIST SP800-108 KDF in counter mode using HMAC with SHA256.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Session key: A session key is created as a result of an authenticated Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchanged between a service host operator and an HSM. The purpose of the exchange is to secure communication between the service host and the members of the domain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contributors

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Document Revisions

For the most up to date version of this white paper, please visit: